Up@dawn 2.0

Friday, February 7, 2014

Group 1: Spirituality Naturalized

Q: Before Flanagan started practicing BuddhismFlanagan , what did he see as the “only good idea” he ever heard from Catholicism?  
A: The Golden Rule

Q: What style of theism does Flanagan contend is “epistemically irresponsible and dangerous” compared to expressive theism?
A:  assertive theism.

Has the Ontological argument for God forced your frontal lobe in a shambolic slumber?  Well, fear no more.  Co-authors Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse from Vanderbilt Philosophy fame are here to un-pretzel your logic.  They even manage go wrestle the Devil out of the details. 

Here's what they call the "devilish' a priori argument for God, which was first proposed by 

1. God is by definition is the greatest possible thing. 

2. If God is the greatest possible thing, then He cannot fail to manifest any perfection — otherwise, there would be a possible thing greater than He.

3. Existence is a perfection; that which does not exist lacks something that would improve it.

4. Therefore, God must exist. 

Notice something's wrong but can't put your finger on it? 

Check out their analysis over at the 3 Quarks Daily.  

7 comments:

  1. The problem with this argument is that existence is thought of as a property, when it is not. Kant (or maybe Hume? I think it's Kant, but I'm not positive) gave a good example to prove that existence is not a property: suppose I have in one hand a pile of coins, and in the other hand a pile of existing coins? What is the difference? Nothing; therefore, existence itself can NOT be a property.

    The updated version of this argument (which I love) is Plantinga's argument (as a sidenote: I've always wondered why atheists go for the St. Anselm version and attack that one, as if it's ever argued by anyone anymore. It comes across as intellectually dishonest to do so, when there is a popular, logically sound, and much updated version out there today, specifically, Plantinga's argument.). I'll give the longer version first, then give a shortened version with a different perspective (but still the same argument):

    1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

    2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

    3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

    4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

    5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

    6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.


    Another way to understand it:

    There are three types of existence: necessary existence, contingent existence, and impossible existence. God would be a maximally great being, and therefore a necessarily existing being. If such a being were possibly existing, then it would not be impossible for that being to exist, leaving on contingency and necessity. However, since the being is necessarily existing, that rules out contingency, leaving only necessity.

    Therefore, if it's possible for a necessarily existent being to exist, then the being exists necessarily.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. This comment has been removed by the author.

      Delete
    2. This comment has been removed by the author.

      Delete
    3. This comment has been removed by the author.

      Delete
    4. This comment has been removed by the author.

      Delete
  2. I typed up 4 lengthy-ass replies to your criticisms. I have since taken them down.

    It's quite clear that you were just looking for an argument, when in your original post you said that "I've always wondered why atheists go for the St. Anselm version and attack that one, as if it's ever argued by anyone anymore. It comes across as intellectually dishonest to do so, when there is a popular, logically sound, and much updated version out there today, specifically, Plantinga's argument."

    Suffice it to say that I take exception to many parts of those few sentences. Yes, we do often argue Plantinga's OAG, and more commonly WL Craig's version (which you presented) of said argument.

    As for intellectual dishonesty...people in glass houses, mate.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Yes, but what do you guys make of Aikin's & Talisse's 3QD argument that the devil's impossibility lurks in the details of the ontological argument?

    Do have fun ripping at one another, if that's your pleasure and nobody else gets terribly hurt. I still prefer constructive to destructive energy.

    ReplyDelete