I hope no one minds if I "take the microphone" so to speak and elaborate a little bit about what I was inarticulately trying to say in class on Thursday, re: science and religion and whether they ask different questions. I believe I heard someone (though not sure who) make a comment to the effect of "That's such a theist argument". My beliefs could be best described as panendeism, or perhaps more simply as form of Spinozan belief in the attributes of a natural world, run on natural laws, which on examination is composed of but one "substance" in many modes.
That being said, mainly I wanted to clarify something. While I do think it is clear that religion has dipped it's toe many many times in science's pool and tried (usually with absurd results) to answer the mechanical questions of how things work and why natural phenomenon happen, I do think it is self-evident that science and the heart/core of religion ultimately are attempts at answering different kinds of questions. Science answers the questions of what, and how. Religion is at it's best when it focuses on the question of meaning, and on answering the 'what now?' parts of inquiry. But I did want to say I do not think religion is the ONLY way to answer these questions. Baggini makes an excellent argument for the ability to find meaning in life apart from any sort of religious discourse. I think it's to Baggini's credit however when he also notes that Atheism and Science can become (as part of Atheism's origins in naturalism) too tightly enmeshed to the point where some atheists forget there are certainly other ways of looking at the world, gathering meaning, and making judgments about human life. This is an area philosophy excels in, and one of the reasons I'm a philosophy major. I can personally think of nothing happier and more fulfilling than tackling the sorts of questions philosophy asks, which are almost never scientific in nature. That being said, I easily grant there is a deep difference between philosophy and theology. My point is merely that the empirical scientific method is not the sole guarantor of knowledge.
The other issue I wanted to briefly (ha, as if that's possible when I write) touch on is the idea of direct experience as proof. Baggini covers this towards the end of the book, when he talks about that for many theists, they simply KNOW God exists, entirely apart from any arguments. I know that many in this class feel it's entirely improper to believe something without sufficient evidence. But to someone who has had this experience of the divine, it is (as Baggini rightly creates the analogy to) as if arguing that I should not believe in my own existence/consciousness. I would submit that the problem is not a belief in the divine based on these experiential grounds, but on the tendency many in the class have noted of humans to try desperately and "fill in the gaps". As Dean (I think it was Dean, might have been David) said on another post, people seem eager to accept a terribly weak explanation rather than no explanation at all.
You see, one of Baggini's primary arguments against this sort of belief, is that Jews seem to feel it as strongly as do Muslims, as do Christians, as do Hindus. They each seem dead certain of their experience of God. And yet, they can't /all/ be right. He would say it is poor form to believe in something on these experiential grounds for which there is obviously contradictory experience. And I precisely agree, 100%. The problem, as I see it, is that people have an experience of divine transcendence, and then lacking the ability to adequately explain it (because the experience is ultimately beyond all explanation or description), they 'fill in the gaps' and let their culture (or some persuasive missionary, or their parents, or a talented theist rhetorician) convince them to fill in specifics that could not possibly follow from their experience.
"Oh," says the pastor, "Clearly what you felt was JESUS coming into your life, and this proves the Bible is true."
"Oh," says the Imam, "Clearly what you felt was the touch of Allah coming into your life, and this proves the Qu'ran is true."
The issue is clear. Both of these are interpretations, they are specific paradigms for looking at an event and trying to explain it. They are weak explanations (because both religions are full of absurdities) that do not necessarily follow from the truth of the experience. What is true (in my opinion) is that people of an open-mind ready to accept wonder into their hearts can look at the universe and the natural world, open themselves up to the mystery of it, and have a trancendent and awe-inspiring experience of contact with SOMETHING. I think it is even clear from some atheistic philosophers and scientists I have seen speak, that they too have had similar experiences, but for them the paradigm they place it in is one of naturalism and science, awe and wonder at the intricacy and natural beauty of the universe.
I hope my point, such as it is, is clear. I'll end this massive missive now with that final thought: For someone who has had this direct experience of the divine, there is no argument against it. For those who have not had it, as Baggini points out, there is no ability to explain or understand it. The failure of religions, and the thing which leads to the sort of religious behavior we all (in this class anyway) find morally repugnant, is in attaching conclusions and baggage to this experience that could not possibly follow from direct examination of the experience itself, but merely attempt to 'fill in gaps' and explain it. I find belief in the divinely transcendent not only rational, but that it would be irrational for me NOT to believe in it...just the same as it would be irrational for me to not believe in gravity. But from that believing standpoint, we must be very careful to not make supposition and irrational arguments or inferences from that fact. The Qu'ran says "Do not say about God more than you know." Unfortunately, apparently no one paid attention.
The Tao that can be spoken of, is not the Tao. As I was heard to say earlier this semester. :)
That being said, mainly I wanted to clarify something. While I do think it is clear that religion has dipped it's toe many many times in science's pool and tried (usually with absurd results) to answer the mechanical questions of how things work and why natural phenomenon happen, I do think it is self-evident that science and the heart/core of religion ultimately are attempts at answering different kinds of questions. Science answers the questions of what, and how. Religion is at it's best when it focuses on the question of meaning, and on answering the 'what now?' parts of inquiry. But I did want to say I do not think religion is the ONLY way to answer these questions. Baggini makes an excellent argument for the ability to find meaning in life apart from any sort of religious discourse. I think it's to Baggini's credit however when he also notes that Atheism and Science can become (as part of Atheism's origins in naturalism) too tightly enmeshed to the point where some atheists forget there are certainly other ways of looking at the world, gathering meaning, and making judgments about human life. This is an area philosophy excels in, and one of the reasons I'm a philosophy major. I can personally think of nothing happier and more fulfilling than tackling the sorts of questions philosophy asks, which are almost never scientific in nature. That being said, I easily grant there is a deep difference between philosophy and theology. My point is merely that the empirical scientific method is not the sole guarantor of knowledge.
The other issue I wanted to briefly (ha, as if that's possible when I write) touch on is the idea of direct experience as proof. Baggini covers this towards the end of the book, when he talks about that for many theists, they simply KNOW God exists, entirely apart from any arguments. I know that many in this class feel it's entirely improper to believe something without sufficient evidence. But to someone who has had this experience of the divine, it is (as Baggini rightly creates the analogy to) as if arguing that I should not believe in my own existence/consciousness. I would submit that the problem is not a belief in the divine based on these experiential grounds, but on the tendency many in the class have noted of humans to try desperately and "fill in the gaps". As Dean (I think it was Dean, might have been David) said on another post, people seem eager to accept a terribly weak explanation rather than no explanation at all.
You see, one of Baggini's primary arguments against this sort of belief, is that Jews seem to feel it as strongly as do Muslims, as do Christians, as do Hindus. They each seem dead certain of their experience of God. And yet, they can't /all/ be right. He would say it is poor form to believe in something on these experiential grounds for which there is obviously contradictory experience. And I precisely agree, 100%. The problem, as I see it, is that people have an experience of divine transcendence, and then lacking the ability to adequately explain it (because the experience is ultimately beyond all explanation or description), they 'fill in the gaps' and let their culture (or some persuasive missionary, or their parents, or a talented theist rhetorician) convince them to fill in specifics that could not possibly follow from their experience.
"Oh," says the pastor, "Clearly what you felt was JESUS coming into your life, and this proves the Bible is true."
"Oh," says the Imam, "Clearly what you felt was the touch of Allah coming into your life, and this proves the Qu'ran is true."
The issue is clear. Both of these are interpretations, they are specific paradigms for looking at an event and trying to explain it. They are weak explanations (because both religions are full of absurdities) that do not necessarily follow from the truth of the experience. What is true (in my opinion) is that people of an open-mind ready to accept wonder into their hearts can look at the universe and the natural world, open themselves up to the mystery of it, and have a trancendent and awe-inspiring experience of contact with SOMETHING. I think it is even clear from some atheistic philosophers and scientists I have seen speak, that they too have had similar experiences, but for them the paradigm they place it in is one of naturalism and science, awe and wonder at the intricacy and natural beauty of the universe.
I hope my point, such as it is, is clear. I'll end this massive missive now with that final thought: For someone who has had this direct experience of the divine, there is no argument against it. For those who have not had it, as Baggini points out, there is no ability to explain or understand it. The failure of religions, and the thing which leads to the sort of religious behavior we all (in this class anyway) find morally repugnant, is in attaching conclusions and baggage to this experience that could not possibly follow from direct examination of the experience itself, but merely attempt to 'fill in gaps' and explain it. I find belief in the divinely transcendent not only rational, but that it would be irrational for me NOT to believe in it...just the same as it would be irrational for me to not believe in gravity. But from that believing standpoint, we must be very careful to not make supposition and irrational arguments or inferences from that fact. The Qu'ran says "Do not say about God more than you know." Unfortunately, apparently no one paid attention.
The Tao that can be spoken of, is not the Tao. As I was heard to say earlier this semester. :)
Hi, Jamie,
ReplyDeleteI am always appreciative of your spirit and infectious enthusiasm, but I have to admit I was somewhat perplexed by your line of reasoning in class on Thursday. I’m glad you posted your thoughts here for further examination. Below are a few quotes taken from your blog post in an effort to further highlight your aforementioned argument.
“I do think it is self-evident that science and the heart/core of religion ultimately are attempts at answering different kinds of questions. Science answers the questions of what, and how. Religion is at it's best when it focuses on the question of meaning, and on answering the 'what now?' parts of inquiry.”
Although I think all religion is epistemologically false, I don’t have an issue with that statement. It would be hard to argue that religion doesn’t give some people meaning in their lives. On the genesis of meaning, you add further:
“But I did want to say I do not think religion is the ONLY way to answer these questions. Baggini makes an excellent argument for the ability to find meaning in life apart from any sort of religious discourse.”
Here, I couldn’t agree more. Religion is obviously not the only way to answer questions of meaning. Many (legions) find meaning in family, friends, poetry, art, music, etc. without the need for the supernatural. J. M. Hecht says you can stake your ‘home’ sign right outside your door. You even further the point here:
“I do think it is self-evident that science and the heart/core of religion ultimately are attempts at answering different kinds of questions.”
Exactly! Two different kinds of questions regarding two completely different things: fact and meaning.
But, in wrapping up your thought, you concluded this particular issue with this final statement:
“My point is merely that the empirical scientific method is not the sole guarantor of knowledge.”
Whoa! What happened? I was with your right up to there; then I got just as confused as I was in class. Your entire argument—up to the last statement—is how religion answers questions of meaning. Then, somehow, you jumped headfirst into logically torrent waters by claiming religious meaning (or secular meaning) somehow leads to ‘knowledge.’ Not only did you run your argument ashore, my worry is that you have loosened the ropes on the definition of the word “knowledge” so much that our ship of logic, to which it was formerly (and happily) anchored in the port reason, is now aimlessly adrift at sea. Either that, or you have presented us with one of those full-scale Deepak style look-at-the-monkey arguments and our bedazzlement has been completely misread.
In all seriousness and joking aside, if you meant to say, “…the empirical scientific method is not the sole guarantor of meaning,” my apologies. If the statement stands, then I think we are in much need of further elucidation.
First, you could help me out by explaining exactly how religion adds anything at all to our knowledge base and understanding of the universe. A universe that is presently illuminated by empirical science that has been proven methodologically unassailable in the investigation and determination of the “how” and the collection of data. And here, by science, I mean the body of science (data) and the scientific method.
Maybe you could give us an example of a specific true claim about anything in the world that we wouldn’t know without theological metaphysics or personal revelation.
Secondly, how does presupposing a god in regards to personal experience add anything more—other than meaning—to that personal experience? More specifically: how does this contribute to the body of knowledge, as we understand it.
Lastly, please define your particular use of the word ‘knowledge’ in the context of your argument.
I think if you (or anyone—chime in please!) would take time to answer these questions, we’ll have a better understanding of exactly what you were trying to communicate in class.
Knowing ignorance is strength. Ignoring knowledge is sickness. ~Lao Tsu
"Maybe you could give us an example of a specific true claim about anything in the world that we wouldn’t know without theological metaphysics or personal revelation."
ReplyDeleteI agree with Dean. I was with you right up until the end, at which point I think you felt compelled to make some sort of leap in defense of religious experience.
I started to respond at length, but then I remembered this blog post by Jerry, which references an excellent article by Baggini. He sums up the argument better than I could.
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/11/06/guardian-writer-foolishly-claims-that-religion-answers-factual-questions/
This is a really healthy and instructive exchange, and Jamie deserves our appreciation for sticking his neck out here... and for trying to be a moderating voice within a community whose loudest voices are routinely amplified by news media and popular prejudice, but whose more temperate representatives are not usually deemed "newsworthy." Constructive cross-cultural dialogue doesn't just happen, it comes about because people take a chance and risk ostracism from all sides. As I was saying the other day, it's not always comfortable to speak from the middle. Kudos, Jamie!
ReplyDeleteOne thing any of us can say in general response to these questions is that each of us knows something nobody else (at least nobody who's not a total empath, if there could be such a thing) possibly can: what it's like to be oneself, with one's particular and peculiar roster of experiences, and immediate acquaintance with how one's beliefs measure and respond to the singularity of that experience and sensibility.
Great questions Dean, and I'll read that link David. I assure you that I have some answers in mind, but I really want to take the time to think seriously about it and make sure that my answer is as well-reasoned as I'm limited of in my capable knowledge.
ReplyDeleteIt is highly probable that my answer won't satisfy anymore than pure empiricism satisfies me. Like Bertrand Russell said (or something to this effect) Epistemology, the question of "what is knowledge" is a difficult one. Because what counts as "knowing", what counts as a "fact" and the link between the two is at best fuzzy and unresolved in philosophical terms.
Okay, I've spent a few days trying to think of how to tackle the questions raised. A good part of the problem is, as I mentioned above. That the questions of what counts as a "fact" and what it means to "know" something are not entirely settled philosophically. And the empiricist/rationalist/skepticism issue is probably too large to tackle here.
ReplyDeleteI basically am a mild constructivist/rationalist. I believe that reason, not empirical sensory data (which are often but not always the same thing), is the best way of making sense out of our world and arriving at any kind of knowledge. However, I think it is also clear that we can not divorce ourselves from our own contexts. By this, I mean that everything we see, feel, observe, read, and understand is inevitably colored by the previous concepts we have had available to us, by our experiences and prejudices, by the habits we've grown accustomed to in thinking, cultural issues, and a host of other factors.
I think those who study how our brains work and how language and text works (Fauconnier, Lakoff and Johnson, and Gadamer are names I can highly recommend in this area) are coming to an understanding that our 'empirical' access to the world is not as clear-cut as we believe it is. To give a much overly simplified summary, it is impossible to see the world "as it really is", because our brains are highly conditioned to blend concepts and create a narrative framework through which to view the world. This extends not merely to things like interpreting texts or how to "feel" about something, but even to observation. Neuroscientist Beau Lotto has said "The physical light entering your eyes is entirely meaningless, because it could literally be anything. We see nothing in the world as it really is, we see it instead in ways which it's been useful to see it in the past."
We make the reasonable assumption that we're capable of observing things as they really are, because our brains have evolved into powerful machines that fill in the gaps and populate our world with concrete objects smoothly, quickly, and unconsciously. However, careful examination of our experience will reveal that most (perhaps not quite all, but most) of the properties we take for granted in the universe around us and the objects we experience are not actually properties of things at all, they are interactional properties based on our experiences with them.
In other words, it is impossible to ever be truly objective about anything, even the most basic empirical observations we can make are filtered through unconscious conceptual layers that are inculcated in us by past experience, cultural expectations, and our own personal paradigm for viewing the world. “We construe the physical, mental, and social worlds we live in by virtue of the integrations we achieve through biology and culture. There is no other way for us to apprehend the world. The Blending is not something we do in addition to living in the world; it is our means of living in the world.” - Giles Fauconnier
In other words, we arrive at a skeptical position as regards our knowledge of absolute truths. In the sense of pure objectivity it seems that this is beyond our cognitive reach. But that does not mean that we have no basis at all for making claims. We arrive at a point somewhere in between subjectivism and objectivism. Truth depends on this understanding which arises from our functioning in the world, but this understanding is achieved only through our own conceptually structuring our experiences within our minds, differing according to the concepts and attitudes we have available to us. Our understanding of the universe is in some ways entirely unique and personal based on unconscious factors, but is in other ways shared because other people happen to have many of the same properties we do, occupying bodies of bi-pedal carbon-based flesh with certain shared biology and communally shared experiences.
ReplyDeleteAll of which is a long-winded way of explaining that I think the most correct argument is that there is no such thing as something that is merely "true" or "false". Things are always "true" or "false" TO SOMEBODY, or in relation to some other thing.
However, we avoid relativism by understanding that this experience of the world is shared. As Dr. Oliver points out, I can never actually KNOW what it is to be you and to live in the world that you do. The experience is unique, but it SHARES enough factors, ranging from being raised in the same family all the way up to the most general of both being human beings, that we can attempt to rationalize about it.
Ultimately, I don't feel this was a very articulate attempt, and I'm sorry. What we're dealing with is incredibly difficult to articulate, as most any foundational meaning to a structure is. To more directly answered the question you asked about how religion (or more precisely, the religious experience, since I like WJ find many of the specifics of religious doctrine absurd) provides knowledge - The same way that any method provides knowledge... indeed, the very way that we MUST exist in the world as beings in order to function at all: By giving us a framework in which to mark and make sense of our experiences. In the case of religious impulse, knowledge of the ephemeral and transcendent experiences accessible to us. In the case of the scientific method, knowledge of the physical interactive properties of how different forces affect both humans and each other.
Thanks for taking the time to write all that out, Jamie. I see where you have taken a stance pointing out that all knowledge is in some sense subjective, and that we cannot arrive at pure empirical facts, since all empirical observations have to filter thru our senses.
DeleteI have reservations about the following, however:
"I believe that reason, not empirical sensory data (which are often but not always the same thing), is the best way of making sense out of our world and arriving at any kind of knowledge."
This implies some sort of "armchair" approach to knowledge, doesn't it? If you arrive at conclusions by avenue of reason alone, what way do you have of knowing if your conclusions coincide with reality? Sooner or later, empirical facts will be the arbiter of truth claims about knowledge. Attacking the foundations of *all* knowledge doesn't really get us anywhere, that I can see.
But then again, maybe I'm wrong.